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Abstract
In a previous work, we have developed a model in which agents choose whether to achieve self-
esteem through work. When they do, they develop an intrinsic motivation to eﬀort. The analysis was
restricted to an employment relation (employers were monopsons). In the present paper, we study
the consequences of the latter analysis on labor market outcomes. The model we provide can give
an account of many important traits of socio-demographic disparities in the labor market (notably
of vertical occupational segregation). We consider how the structure of the labor market conditions
this account.
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In a previous work, we have posited a theory of socio-demographic disparities in the labor market based
on a special kind of occupational segregation. From the characterization of a subset of selective (upon
socio-demographic criteria) jobs within the set of jobs1 we have made explicit potential consequences of
this occupational segregation on socio-demographic gaps in average earnings. This gap - favorable to the
agents who "Þt in" the workplace identity - may be a consequence of the fact that, depending on certain
conditions, the share of selective jobs is an increasing function of the wage standard under consideration:
hiring is more likely to be selective among better-paid jobs. This results from the fact that, all other
things equal, a job compensation increases with its degree of demands and that the more demanding a
job, the stronger employers propensity to mobilize intrinsic motivation from workers i.e. to arouse the
workplace identity. That is precisely on criteria predisposing certain working persons to the workplace
identity that selective hiring occurs in our analysis. Our explanation of socio-demographic gaps in average
earnings (as a statistical fact) is thus very simple: female workers and black workers would earn less than
white male workers because of their concentration among less demanding jobs.
But still, the assumptions upon which we have developed this argument are restrictive (so that we have
talked of "potential consequences") and we have provided little discussion of the conditions of its validity.
This article, thus, aims at clarifying the channel through which the kind of occupational segregation we
have considered impacts on the average earnings of each socio-demographic group within an appropriate
framework. In the following, we leave aside the issue of asymmetrical information characterizing the
employment relation to study the connection of the trade-oﬀ between workplace and out-of-the-workplace
identity to market mechanisms. This choice allows us to more directly explore the conditions for our
argument to be valid.
Our point is that non-wage diﬀerences between various jobs, on the one hand, the heterogeneity
of workers preferences, on the other hand, justify that employers be endowed with a special market
power. As a consequence, in this paper, we assume that oligopsony prevails in the labor market. Such
an assumption allows us to reproduce and clarify the case considered in previous works and to study the
impact of competition between employment oﬀers on our argument regarding socio-demographic gaps in
average earnings.
The model of this paper allows us to stress the very nature of our argument: that is a macroeconomic
argument. The gap in average earnings favorable to the workers of the "dominant" group does not
trivially derive from their predisposition to the workplace identity. This predisposition may actually lead
them to accept "low" pay relatively to the degree of demands of the job under consideration, such pay
level that a worker of the "dominated" group would not have accepted. By providing an example for
which the gap in average earnings is favorable to the dominated group, we put forward the role of the
pool of jobs composition in socio-demographic disparities to emerge.
This article includes two parts. The Þrst is devoted to the introduction of our model. We brießy situate
it among labor market models mobilizing workers preferences on employment conditions: we show that
our approach exhibits a double diﬀerentiation, both vertical and horizontal. We then introduce a model
1 Jobs are considered as pairs (φ, ψ), that is (non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities, degree of demands).
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of labor market with workers manifesting self-esteem motivations. The second part explores, through a
simple numerical example, the conditions for our argument to be valid as well as the mechanisms ruling
the average earnings of various social groups when competition exists between employers in the labor
market. In this second step, we particularly study the impact of labor market rationing on welfare.
1 Employment conditions and strategic interaction in the labor
market
This section is devoted to the introduction of a model of oligopsony in the labor market
1.1 Workers preferences on employment conditions and labor market func-
tioning
The role of workers preferences on employment conditions are mainly apprehended by the theory of
compensating diﬀerentials. The idea is that, all other things equals, higher wages compensate less sat-
isfying employment conditions. Perfectly competitive labor market models predictions - in particular
the law of single wage - should be understood taking into account employment conditions heterogeneity.
Competition between Þrms, on one side, between workers, on the other, level out utilities attached to
various jobs. This theory lies on objective diﬀerences between jobs: diﬀerentiation is vertical. In other
words, workers preferences on jobs characteristics are similar.
But workers preferences on jobs characteristics can also be heterogeneous. A given job may provide
diﬀerent utility levels depending on the worker under consideration. In such a case, there is an horizontal
diﬀerentiation of jobs. This aﬀects labor market functioning since labor supply puts to a particular Þrm is
then deÞned (contrary to what prevails under perfect competition). Oligopsony models of labor market
specify and illustrate the way heterogeneous preferences on labor conditions may aﬀect labor market
functioning.
In the model of the employment relation provided in early works, the form of workers preferences
is endogenous: it is deÞned in equilibrium, adjusting in particular to the employment conditions oﬀered
by the employer. We have identify employment relations with a pair (φ,ψ) where ψ is the degree of
demands of the job while the component φ is a measure of the non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities it
provides. The important point is that this second component only enters as an argument of the utility
function of a worker if he holds the workplace identity. Hence, for a similar degree of demands, two
agents, the one holding the out-of-the-workplace identity, the other the workplace identity, may attach
the corresponding job diﬀerent levels of utility. This justiÞes, in the spirit of compensating diﬀerential,
diﬀerent compensation. There is thus heterogeneous employment conditions as well as heterogeneous
workers.
For a given type (and/or identity), jobs are vertically diﬀerentiated. Some jobs are demanding, others
are less: earning gaps reßect "objective" diﬀerences: vertical diﬀerentiation lies on ψ. Between workers
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of diﬀerent types, when equilibrium identity diﬀer, jobs are horizontally diﬀerentiated. Workers holding
the identity A are sensitive to non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities provided by their job, others are
not: horizontal diﬀerentiation lies on the hedonic valuation, or not, of variable φ. Employers take this
heterogeneity into account.
1.2 A model of strategic interaction in the labor market
We consider agents who choose to achieve self-esteem either through work (identity A) or through other
activities outside ones working life (identity B). This choice conditions the form of their utility function.
Eﬀort is perfectly observed ex post by employers so that a contract only stipulates a transfer2 w ≥ 0 when
the agent exerts eﬀort (otherwise, employer can punish the agent). We denote J the set of available jobs.
Jobs are indexed by j ∈ J , job j being characterized by ¡Sj , φj , ψj¢ ∈ R3+. The proÞt of employer j is
simply Sj − wj . Let nθ > 0 be the number of agents with trait θ ∈ {0, 1}. When working in the job j
paid wj , an agent with trait θs utility writes
Uc (j, wj ; θ) =
 (1 + γw)wj − ψj + IA
¡
φj ; θ
¢
if c = A
wj − ψj + IB if c = B
where IA
¡
φj ; θ
¢
= φj − γwwA − γθ (1− θ), θ ∈ {0, 1}.
Information and timing. The timing of the market game is as follows. 1) The composition of the
pool of labor suppliers (n0 and n1) is observed by potential employers. 2) Each Þrm j makes a single
hiring oﬀer, that is, makes a take-it or leave-it wage oﬀer.3 3) A Þrst employment applicant is randomly
drawn from the pool of labor suppliers, he perfectly observes all hiring oﬀers and choose whether to
remain outsider or to become the employee of a Þrm j; in that case, job j is subtracted from the set of
hiring oﬀers. 4) A second employment applicant is randomly drawn among remaining labor suppliers; it
is his turn to choose whether to accept one of the remaining oﬀers or to be an outsider. 5) The process
go one until: all the jobs are Þlled and/or all the applicants have been drawn.
Behaviors, employment conditions and utility. Firms oﬀering a job have two ordered concerns:
Þrst, to Þll the job and make a positive proÞt on it; second, when it is Þlled, to minimize the required
transfer i.e. to hire the agent who will do the job for the least pay. By choosing to leave the job unÞlled,
she guarantees a null proÞt. Hence, job j is Þlled if and only if wj ≤ Sj and we can restrict employer js
strategy set to [0, Sj ].4
For all j ∈ J and θ ∈ {0, 1} let
Uj (wj ; θ) := max
©
(1 + γw)wj − ψj + IA
¡
φj ; θ
¢
;wj − ψj + IB
ª
this function represents the utility of an agent of type θ taken into account his capacity to adjust his
identity to oﬀered employment conditions. The fact that this function be indexed by j should not lead
2The assumption that transfers must remain positive amounts to assuming that jobs degree of demand ψ is large enough.
3An hiring oﬀer is not allowed to be contingent upon non-productive traits (such as once gender).
4Any strategy wj > Sj is strictly dominated.
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to confusions: j refers to oﬀered employment conditions
¡
ψj , φj
¢
. The form of agents preferences being
deÞned but for the trait θ, we are mainly interested in the utility level some employment conditions can
arouse for a given pay, which we consider to the pair (j, wj). By staying at home, an agent gets a utility
IB > 0 so that an agent with trait θ accepts the hiring oﬀer (j, wj) if and only if Uj (wj ; θ) ≥ IB . Let
wj (U ; θ) = min
½
ψj+U−IA(φj ;θ)
1+γw
;ψj + U − IB
¾
: for all θ ∈ {0, 1}, wj (.; θ) denotes the inverse function
of Uj (.; θ).
Note that, by putting aside the issue of eﬀort observability, we abolish the diﬀerence between strongly
and weakly fulÞlling jobs - see Baguelin (2005a). Our typology is restricted to two classes: unfulÞlling
and fulÞlling jobs. Let us indicate within this new context conditions of selective hiring (upon socio-
demographic criteria). A job is selective if it is fulÞlling for agents with trait θ = 1. It is non-selective if
unfulÞlling to for agents with trait θ = 1 (a fortiori, it is then unfulÞlling to agents with trait θ = 0).
We provide in the appendix a general deÞnition of labor market equilibrium and prove its existence.
Yet, up to now, we cannot provide general results. Failing that, we examine, in the next step, the main
mechanisms and implications of our model as regards socio-demographic disparities in earnings on the
basis of simple example.
2 Market mechanisms and sociodemographic disparities
The purpose of this section is to explore from a simple numerical example, our model mechanism and to
draw some consequences as regards socio-demographic disparities.
2.1 The elements of the example
Let us present the speciÞc assumptions of our example.
2.1.1 Three jobs with distinct characteristics
Let us assume γw = γθ =
1
2 and wA = 1, and consider three jobs J = {1, 2, 3}. These jobs are
characterized by
ψ\φ 1 2
1 Job 1 Job 3
2 Job 2
Job 1 is little demanding but does not provide many non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities. Job 2 is
demanding without providing better non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities than the job 1. By contrast,
the job 3 is both little demanding and source of many non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities. Job 2 will
usually obviously give rise to higher compensations than the two others (compensating diﬀerential). For
this very reason, the assignment of this job to an agent with trait 0 or 1 will play a crucial role in resulting
socio-demographic gap in average earnings.
All through this illustration, we make the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis It is assumed that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Sj ≥ wj (IB ; 0).
This latter hypothesis guarantees that each Þrm can make a wage oﬀer meeting the participation
constraint of an agent with trait 0 - a fortiori that of an agent with trait 1 since wj (IB; 0) ≥ wj (IB ; 1).
This hypothesis is particularly important when agents with trait 1 are scarce.
Previous values imply
w1 (U ; θ) = min
½
2
3
U +
1
3
(2− θ) ; 1 + U − IB
¾
w2 (U ; θ) = min
½
2
3
(U + 1) +
1
3
(2− θ) ; 2 + U − IB
¾
w3 (U ; θ) = min
½
2
3
(U − 1) + 1
3
(2− θ) ; 1 + U − IB
¾
Each employer is either indiﬀerent between types 0 and 1 workers or strictly prefer type 1 workers.
In that case corresponding job will be said selective.
2.1.2 Expected average earnings per socio-demographic groups
The average earnings of a given socio-demographic group depends on its distribution between diﬀerent
jobs. This distribution depends itself on the relative frequency of types 0 and 1. The algorithm we have
chosen to account for the impact of this relative frequency (on the distribution of socio-demographic
groups between the jobs) generally implies that the order in which types 0 and 1 workers apply matters
. We want to neutralize that. To do it, we propose to consider expected average earnings given the
relative frequency of the types 0 and 1. The point is about weighting average earnings resulting from
each conÞguration by the probability of this conÞguration occurrence.
Let p (θ1, θ2, θ3) denote the probability that the conÞguration "job 1 is Þlled by an agent with trait
θ1, job 2 by an agent with trait θ2, and job 3 by an agent with trait θ3", θ1,θ2 and θ3 ∈ {0, 1}, and
wˆθ (θ1, θ2, θ3) the corresponding average wage within the population of workers with trait θ. When no
agent of one group is employed, θ1 = θ2 = θ3, we Þx the average wage for this group to 0 - the reservation
wage. Hence, we can always compute the expected average wage wˆθ for workers with trait θ. It is given
by
wˆθ =
P
(θ1,θ2,θ3)∈{0,1}3
p (θ1, θ2, θ3) wˆ
θ (θ1, θ2, θ3)
Probability p (θ1, θ2, θ3) derives from a random successive draw of agents among the work force. It is
assumed that, in case of indiﬀerence, between available jobs from a drawn agent, the latter chooses each
of them with identical probability.
2.1.3 The situation of reference and the steps of the analysis
We successively consider three cases. The Þrst one corresponds to the absence of a signiÞcant competition
between employers: this is our reference situation. Within a framework where labor supply and demand
are both heterogeneous, the case of a simple juxtaposition of three monopsons allows us to focus on the
choice, for each job, of a particular type of applicant independently from the choice of other employers.
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This situation is precisely the one we considered earlier. The second case corresponds to the shortage of
type 1 agents (agent with trait θ = 1). In addition to the impact of this shortage on the gap in average
pay of groups 0 and 1, we examine consequences in terms of eﬃciency. To this extent, it oﬀers an echo
to the analysis of the employment relation we provide in an early work where we have underlined the
impact of the intrinsic motivation on the eﬃciency of the employment relation. The third case deals with
a global shortage of agents (i.e. of both types 0 and 1). Which group beneÞts the most of the competition
between employers? The point is about echoing to the crowding hypothesis - Bergmann (1971).
2.2 No signiÞcant competition between employers (in the labor market)
Assume that the number of applicants of each type, n0 and n1, be large enough so that labor demand is
immune from signiÞcant competition. For nθ ≥ 3 whatever θ, Þrms can a priori behave as monopsons
and bind applicants participation constraint. Whether they be of type 0 or 1, an employees utility is
then IB and wages
w1 (IB; θ) = min
©
2
3IB +
1
3 (2− θ) ; 1
ª
w2 (IB; θ) = min
©
2
3 (IB + 1) +
1
3 (2− θ) ; 2
ª
w3 (IB; θ) = min
©
2
3 (IB − 1) + 13 (2− θ) ; 1
ª
Job j will be selective if and only if wj (IB; 1) < wj (IB; 0). Under our initial hypothesis, the selective
feature of a job only depends on parameter IB. We have
Selective jobs as a function of IB
IB < 1 1 ≤ IB < 3/2 3/2 ≤ IB < 2 2 ≤ IB
Job 1 selective non-selective non-selective non-selective
Job 2 selective selective non-selective non-selective
Job 3 selective selective selective non-selective
Hence, for IB ≥ 2, no employer has a strict preference for type 1 applicants. For given employment
conditions, a rise in IB increases the relative attraction of outside-work, in particular for agents with
trait 1. The two types tend to adopt a similar out-of-the-workplace identity which makes them perfect
substitutes. By contrast, for IB < 1, outside-work is little attractive, in particular for applicants of type
0. Yet, when the point is about arousing an intrinsic motivation, type 1 applicants have an advantage,
jobs are selective.
In the following, we mainly pay attention to the IB values which make job 2 switch from non-selective
to selective. Our point is indeed about illustrating the core argument suggested in Baguelin (2005a): all
other things equal (particularly non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities), the most demanding jobs switch
to the set of selective jobs before others. But these jobs are precisely those which require the highest
pay. In our example, in the absence of a signiÞcant competition between employers, the gap in average
pay favorable to type 1 applicants derives from the proportion of fulÞlling jobs (to type 1 workers) in
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the economy. When fulÞlling jobs are the minority, agents of type 0 beneÞt of an expected average pay
strictly higher than that of agents with trait 1.
2.2.1 A majority of unfulÞlling jobs
Let us assume IB = 32 . In that case, in the absence of a signiÞcant competition between employers, only
the job 3 is selective in the equilibrium (Þrm 3 is the only one who favors applicants of type 1). In the
equilibrium, jobs 1 and 2 are unfulÞlling whatever the type of their holder. Job 3 is fulÞlling for agents
of type 1. Let us denote w = (w1;w2;w3).
Equilibrium 1 For IB = 32 , n1 ≥ 1 and n0 + n1 ≥ 3, employers do not signiÞcantly compete in the
labor market - they bind their employees participation constraint. Labor market equilibrium is given by
w =
µ
1; 2;
2
3
+ ε
¶
where ε = 0 if n1 ≥ 3, ε > 0, ε→ 0 otherwise. The hiring oﬀer of Þrm 3 can only be chosen by an agent
of type 1 (it violates the participation constraint of type 0 agents).
This equilibrium characterization is provided in the appendix.
As we have seen in chapter 3, Þlling an unfulÞlling job requires a complete compensation of corre-
sponding demands; by contrast, the fulÞlling job is paid below its "objective" disutility.
Let us compare average pay between socio-demographic groups. The strict preference of the employer
3 for type 1 workers entails, for all θ1, θ2 ∈ {0, 1}, p (θ1, θ2, 0) = 0. For n1 ≥ 3, an employer targeting
a type 1 agent has not to worry that her hiring oﬀer meet no demand. For n1 = n0 = 3 we obtain5
wˆ0 = 1, 135 > wˆ1 ' 0, 961. Other values of (n0, n1) are considered in the appendix.6 One can in particular
consider the case of a total absence of type 0 agents. This absence turns out to be perfectly painless
to the Þrms: type 1 agent can indeed be substituted. There exists, as we have seen, an asymmetrical
substitutability between types. If certain jobs require type 1 workers, such workers are always perfect
substitute of type 0 workers. For 1 ≤ n1 < 3, at least one job is Þlled with one agent of each type.
Firm 3 oﬀers 23 + ε so that a type 1 agent always favor this oﬀer. For n1 = n0 = 2 one obtains
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wˆ0 = 32 > 1, 135 > 0, 961 > wˆ
1 = 2124 +
3
4ε. The gap in average earnings favorable to type 0 agents is
widen. The relative shortage of type 1 agents leads to a reduction in their average pay. This simply
results from the fact that the probability that an agent 1 holds jobs 1 or 2 - the better paid - is reduced
while job 3 is held by a type 1 agent with probability 1. Contrary to usual intuition, here, the growing
shortage of type 1 applicants ampliÞes an expected gap in average earnings favorable to type 0 workers.
As long as the most demanding jobs remain unfulÞlling to agents of type 1, the average pay of agents
of type 0 can be higher than that of type 1 agents: the predisposition of type 1 agent for the workplace
identity plays negatively on (expected) average earnings within group 1. Indeed, employer 3 relies on this
predisposition to charge lower pay. Group 1, however, enjoy a "guaranteed" access to employment while
5See the proof in the appendix.
6 In this Þrst step however, we favor the case of an equal representation of both types applicants in the labor market.
7 See the proof in the appendix.
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group 0 does not - at least so far the number of 1 is large enough. Besides, in the case n1 < 3, type 1
workers enjoy a utility level strictly higher than that of type 0 workers.
The main conclusion of this step (expected average earnings gap favorable to the group 0) is called
into question when the more demanding job becomes fulÞlling.
2.2.2 A majority of fulÞlling jobs to a type 1 worker
Let us consider the case IB = 32 − 5 where 5 > 0, 5 → 0. In this case, employers 2 and 3 strictly prefer
agents of type 1.
Equilibrium 1 For IB = 32 − 5, n1 ≥ 2 and n0 + n1 ≥ 3, employers do not signiÞcantly compete -
they bind their employees participation constraint. Labor market equilibrium is given by
w =
µ
1; 2− 2
3
5+ ε;
2
3
− 2
3
5+ ε
¶
where ε = 0 if n1 ≥ 3, ε > 0, ε→ 0 otherwise. Hiring oﬀers of Þrms 2 and 3 can only be chosen by type
1 applicants (they violate the participation constraint of type 0 agents).
This equilibrium characterization is provided in appendix.
This marginal reduction in agents reservation utility does not identically aﬀect the surplus of each
Þrm. All other things equal, only Þrms 2 and 3 beneÞt from this reduction. Let us compare expected
average earnings of each group. For n0 = n1 = 3, we obtain8 wˆ0 = 34 < wˆ
1 = 4736 − 11185. The expected
average earnings gap becomes favorable to type 1 agents. This remains true as n0 = n1 = 2: wˆ0 = 1 <
wˆ1 = 43 +
4
3ε− 235.
The fact that the job 2 (the better paid) switch in the set of selective jobs before the job 1 (the more
poorly paid) is obviously not accidental. This results from the fact that job 2 is the most demanding (all
other things equal). Indeed, the more demanding a job the better paid and the more likely arousing the
workplace identity will be proÞtable.
Here is illustrated the very idea of the explanation suggested in Baguelin (2005a) of the socio-
demographic gaps in average earnings: these gaps result from the overrepresentation of the most de-
manding jobs among selective ones.9 Indeed, an employer appeal to an intrinsic motivation is, for given
non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities φ, all the more likely that the job under consideration is demanding.
A job compensation being an increasing function of its degree of demands, its ranking among fulÞlling
jobs is, all other things equal, all the more likely that it is well-paid and hence an earning gap favorable
to agents of type 1.
From now on, we would like to evaluate the impact of a readjustment of market powers (on the labor
market) on previous argument. How does this readjustment (favorable to labor supply) aﬀect socio-
demographic gaps in average earnings? We have seen below that the relative shortage of type 0 agents
(for a total number of applicants higher than 3) was painless to the Þrms. We could have also underline
8See the proof in the appendix.
9FulÞlling to type 1 agents.
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that this shortage has no consequences regarding eﬃciency. In the remaining, we successively consider:
the case of a shortage of agents of type 1; the case of a global shortage of agents.
2.3 Competition between Þrms hiring oﬀers
The main issue raised in the following is about the eﬀects of a shortage of labor supply on the socio-
demographic gap in average earnings. Does this shortage increase or reduce the gap between average
earnings?
We distinguish between two kinds of situations. The Þrst assumes an asymmetrical shortage: type 1
applicants are scarce but not those of type 0. Employers targeting type 1 agents in the absence of any
shortage have to decide whether to maintain this option (which supposes to increase their wage oﬀer)
or to make do with type 0 employees. In that case, they must decide whether arousing an intrinsic
motivation. We examine the impact of type 1 agents shortage on welfare. The second situation assumes
a shortage of both types agents. In a case of equal shortage, how is the gap in average earnings between
groups changed? The examination of this question is the occasion to consider the impact of labor return
on the gap in average earnings of groups 0 and 1.
2.3.1 A shortage of agents of type 1
We continue the analysis in the going about a new step. The shortage does not concern type 0 agents, we
thus assume n0 ≥ 2. We show below that the shortage of type 1 agents is favorable, in terms of average
earning, to the group 0. The global well-being yet is aﬀected. We consider two conÞgurations: in the one,
the renunciation to hire type 1 worker goes with a renouncement to stimulate an intrinsic motivation;
in the other, Þrm under consideration makes the most of the capacity of type 0 agents to develop an
intrinsic motivation.
Type 0 workers are conÞned to unfulÞlling jobs. As in equilibrium 1, let us assume IB = 32 − 5,
5 > 0, 5→ 0. Here, the shortage of type 1 agents involves n1 = 1.
Equilibrium 2 For IB = 32 − 5, 5 > 0, 5 → 0, n1 = 1 and n0 ≥ 2, employers 2 and 3 compete to
hire a type 1 agent. Employer 3 takes the advantage so that 1 and 2 both hire a type 0 applicant. Labor
market equilibrium is thus given by
w =
µ
1; 2;
2
3
+
2
3
ε
¶
where ε > 0, ε→ 0
The hiring oﬀer of Þrm 3 can only be chosen by an agent of type 1.
This equilibrium is characterized in the appendix.
Job 2 is fulÞlling10 to an agent of type 1... not to an agent of type 0. The conÞguration (0, 0, 1)
prevails with probability 1, so that wˆ0 = 32 > wˆ
1 = 23 (1 + ε). In terms of earnings, the shortage of agents
10See equilibrium 1.
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of type 1 is then favorable to the group 0. The shortage of type 1 applicants, makes job 2 (the better
paid) available to type 0 agents.
But still, the shortage of type 1 applicants is globally prejudicial: it leads to a loss in eﬃciency.11
This situation is an echo of the discussion provided in Baguelin (2005a) on the gains in eﬃciency due to
the workplace identity. Grafting the argument suggested in Baguelin (2005a) on this discussion leads us
to the welfare consequences of a shortage of type 1 agents: a "free" labor (the work done by intrinsically
motivated workers) is subtracted from the system.
FulÞlling jobs are shared. We have mentioned in Baguelin (2005a) the advantages of a policy focusing
on the development of fulÞlling jobs from the perspective of "dominated" groups working persons. The
next situation illustrates these advantages in terms of eﬃciency.
Equilibrium 2 For IB = 1 − 5, 5 > 0, 5 → 0, n1 = 1 and n0 ≥ 3, employers 1, 2 and 3 compete
to hire a type 1 worker. The latter is indiﬀerent between Þrms 2 and 3 hiring oﬀers but strictly prefer
them to that of Þrm 1. Labor market equilibrium leads to
w =
µ
1; 2− 2
3
5;
2
3
− 2
3
5
¶
Hiring oﬀers of these three Þrms could each be chosen by a type 0 agent.
This equilibrium is characterized in the appendix.
For12 n0 = 3 and n1 = 1, expected average pays are given by13 wˆ0 = 3227 − 10275 > wˆ1 = 89 − 49 5.
When type 1 agents are scarce, fulÞlling jobs (here jobs 2 or 3) become available to type 0 applicants.
The capacity of type 0 agents to develop an intrinsic work motivation is used: this moderates the loss in
eﬃciency highlighted in the previous case.
This case is characterized by a gap between the well-being of type 1 workers and type 0 workers. In
jobs 2 and 3, worker 1 beneÞts from the pay which would have been oﬀered to a 0 although these jobs are
intrinsically fulÞlling: U1 = 32 − 5 >> U0 (= 1− 5). The shortage of type 1 agents may look unfavorable
in terms of pay, this latter situation highlights the beneÞts they draw from it in terms of well-being.
One should note that previous conÞguration did not mobilized Sj values beyond our initial hypothesis
i.e. Sj ≤ wj (IB ; 0) for all j. This is due to the fact that hiring a type 0 agent is an option always
available to the Þrms. How does employers exposure to an intensiÞed competition aﬀect the gap in
average earnings between groups?
2.3.2 The case of a global shortage of the labor force.
We content ourselves with the case n0 = n1 = 1 and assume, as in equilibrium 1, IB = 32 . The role of the
gross surpluses Sj becomes critical. Indeed, one of the three Þrms is then excluded from labor market:
11Our reference is the equilibrium 1. Let us denote Ω10 the collective well-being - obtained by summing the utilities of
employees and the surplus of Þrms - in equilibrium 1 and Ω2 collective well-being in equilibrium 2. We have Ω
n1=2
10 > Ω2
and Ωn1≥3
10 > Ω2 for ' > ε.
12Here, the assumption that competition is centered on type 1 applicants requires n0 ≥ 3.
13 See the derivation in appendix.
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the less oﬀering.
Numerical assumptions. The initial hypothesis involves: S1 ≥ 1, S2 ≥ 2 and S3 ≥ 1. The fact that
job 3 oﬀers large non-wage gratiÞcation opportunities compared to the two others endows employer 3
with special market power. In this section, we would like to explore the eﬀect of a gradual readjustment of
the balance regarding market power (in favor of employers 1 and 2) on the average earnings gap between
groups. To do that, we maintain the gross surplus of job 3 constant while considering a parallel increase
of the gross surplus of jobs 1 and 2. Our choice as regards numerical assumptions, thus, aims at: i)
illustrating the evolution of the gap between earnings as Þrms 1 and 2 intensify the competitive pressure
on Þrm 3; ii) illustrating the reversal of the earnings gap as a consequence of the crowding out of employer
3. Yet, in this choice, we have cared about maintaining a common scale for the surpluses of Þrms 2 and
3: the gross surplus of Þrm 2 per unity of demands gradually increases up to exceeding job 3 surplus.
Moreover, most of the conÞgurations likely to occur (see the appendix) are considered.
What is at stake here is simply having clearer ideas of the mechanisms likely to play in the case of a
global shortage of labor. We consider the six following cases.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
S1
28
20
31
20
33
20
34
20
36
20
44
20
S2
¡
= 32S1
¢
84
40
93
40
99
40
102
40
108
40
132
40
S3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
That is, in terms of gross surplus per unity of demands:
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
S1
ψ1
' 1, 40 1, 55 1, 65 1, 70 1, 80 2, 2
S2
ψ2
' 1, 05 1, 16 1, 23 1, 27 1, 35 1, 65
S3
ψ3
' 1, 33 1, 33 1, 33 1, 33 1, 33 1, 33
Results and discussion. The reference situation (Ref.) is the equilibrium 1 where employers do not
compete. This is the relevant reference to the extent that gross surplus do not have a part beyond the
initial hypothesis: whatever the case under consideration (1 to 6), the single diﬀerence to equilibrium 1
actually lies on applicants shortage. Results of the analysis are presented in the next table.
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Impact of the competition between Þrms hiring oﬀers
¡
IB =
3
2
¢
n0 + n1 ≥ 3
n1 ≥ 1
n0 = n1 = 1
Ref. Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
w1 1
132
120 + ε
159
120 + ε
177
120 + ε
186
120 + ε
200
120 + ε
w2 2 n. f.(1) n. f. n. f. n. f. 320120 + ε
w3
2
3 + ε
92
120 + ε
119
120 + ε
137
120 + ε
146
120 + ε n. f.
w1−wR e f .1
wR e f .1
' 0 0, 10 0, 32 0, 47 0, 55 0, 66
w2−wR e f .2
wR e f .2
' 0 n. d.(2) n. d. n. d. n. d. 0, 33
w3−wR e f .3
wR e f .3
' 0 0, 15 0, 48 0, 71 0, 82 n. d.
wˆ0 [1; 2] 132120 + ε
159
120 + ε
177
120 + ε
186
120 + ε
200
120 + ε
wˆ1
£
80
120 + ε;
160
120 +
1
2ε
¤
92
120 + ε
119
120 + ε
137
120 + ε
146
120 + ε
320
120 + ε
wˆ1−wˆ0
wˆ0 ' - −0, 30 −0, 25 −0, 22 −0, 21 0, 60
(1) non-Þlled job; (2) non-deÞned.
The job 2 is obviously excluded from the market in the cases 1 to 4: this is the more demanding job.
Unless its gross surplus be particularly high, Þrms oﬀering the most demanding jobs are the Þrst to suﬀer
as a result of a global shortage of applicants.
Let us start by discussing cases 1 to 4. The shortage obviously results in an increase in earnings.
Previous results allow to observe that the pace of this increase diﬀer depending on whether one considers
the job 1 (Þlled with a type 0 agent) or 3 (Þlled with a type 1 agent). We have computed the relative gap
to the reference situation for these jobs. It turns out that (see the appendix) competition is focused on
the sole employer 2 exclusion which is, as we said earlier, particularly interested in hiring a type 1 agent.
Employer 2, thus, exerts a stronger pressure on the employer 3 than on the employer 1 and hence the
asymmetry as regards the pace of the increases in equilibrium wages 1 and 3. The evolution of the earning
gap between the groups - favorable to type 0 workers (see equilibrium 1) - reßects previous observation:
the increase of labor return in job 2 is relatively more favorable to agents of type 1 than to agent of type
0.
The reversal occurring between cases 4 and 5 underlines the observation we made by distinguishing
equilibria 1 and 1. The earnings gap favorable to the agents of type 1 is mostly due to their prevalence
among the most demanding jobs. That is why the crowding out of the Þrm 3 by employer 2 involves an
(average) earnings gap favorable to type 1 workers.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the main aspects of the analysis.
The important point of this analysis seems the following. For comparable gross surplus, competition
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Figure 1: Net surplus for jobs 1, 2, and 3.
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Figure 2: Average earnings for workers of type 0 and 1.
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is unfavorable to the employers oﬀering the most demanding jobs. Corresponding Þrms, hence, tend
to be crowd out from the labor market. Yet, the pressure their existence exerts on operating Þrms is
asymmetric. Indeed, Þrms oﬀering the most demanding jobs are also the most prone to solicit type 1
agents. Maintaining outside the market is thus more costly to the Þrms employing type 1 workers than
to others.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a series of conÞgurations illustrating how our argument of self-esteem
achievement through work interplays with labor market functioning.
The case of no signiÞcant competition between employers corresponded to the situation examined in
Baguelin (2005a). We have established that, if the "dominant" socio-demographic group could beneÞt
from a guaranteed access to employment, nothing in our micro model assumptions predetermine a gap
in average earnings favorable to this group. The average earnings gap favorable to agents of type 1 does
not trivially derives from their predisposition to the workplace identity. Indeed, this predisposition may
lead them to accept "low" pays relatively to the degree of demands of the jobs under consideration, pay
levels that a 0 agent would not have accepted. In the example considered above, when unfulÞlling jobs
were the majority, group 1 has an expected average pay lower than that of the group 0. This is only
when fulÞlling jobs are a majority that the earnings gap becomes favorable to the group 1. The example
shows that, all other things equal, a job is all the more likely to require the workplace identity (and then
to be selective) that it is more demanding and then better paid.
We have also explored the consequences of a shortage of type 1 agents. A Þrst situation (where type
0 agents keep holding unfulÞlling jobs) allows us to illustrate some consequences in terms of eﬃciency,
of an under-utilization of the capacity of employees to develop an intrinsic work motivation. A second
situation illustrated the policy prescription made in Baguelin (2005a) conclusion: designing jobs which
are fulÞlling from the point of view of agents belonging to the "dominated" group. We could have shown
that this allows to moderate the loss in eﬃciency resulting from the shortage of type 1 agents.
The issue of a special "shortage" of type 0 agents has been brießy raised. In fact, we have highlighted
that the asymmetric substitutability of applicants 0 and 1 (agent 1 is always substitutable to an agent 0
but the reverse is false) excluded that a "shortage" of type 0 workers be detrimental to any employer in
the absence of a global shortage of applicants. The last step of our analysis precisely dealt with this case.
This led us to see the relative beneÞts drawn by each group from its shortage. The increases in average
pay obtained by type 1 workers are always higher than that of type 0 workers. In other words, a global
shortage in labor supply seem to be more beneÞcial to the workers of the "dominant" group. This results
from the fact that competition tends to push the most demanding jobs aside. The competitive pressure
exerted by this outsider seems asymmetrical: since corresponding employers are mostly interested by
agents of the "dominant" group, they impose their actual employers higher wage increases.
Previous observations remain temporary conclusions. DeÞnitive results require the analytical char-
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acterization of the labor market equilibrium in the general case, which still needs to be achieved. The
general model provided in appendix allows to make oneself ideas as regards to the obstacle we meet.
A last remark deserves attention which deal with the structure of the market game introduced above.
Our assumption as regards the sequence characterizing the match of labor supply and demand may
appear as dissatisfying: it is at least clearly arbitrary. Yet, we believe the observation we derived from
this assumption should not be strongly aﬀected. In our point of view, this assumption has a functional
rather than substantial scope: it is rather an algorithm allowing the characterization of an equilibrium
matching. We could have used more sophisticated algorithms such as that of Gale and Shapley usually
used in matching models. The important point is to obtain stable equilibria which we believe is the case
here.
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Appendix
In current appendix, one will Þnd the calculation of expected average earnings wˆ0 and wˆ1 in the diﬀerent
cases considered above, the characterization of equilibria 1 to 3.6 and an attempt of general model.
3 The calculation of expected average earnings of groups 0 and
1
This calculation comprises two steps. The Þrst consists in determining the equilibrium earnings for each
employment conÞguration; the second step is to calculate their respective probability. The procedure
to calculate the probability of the diﬀerent conÞgurations occurrence derives from the conditions of the
match of labor oﬀer and demand. It exhibits little variation from one case to the other but deserves
attention for qualitative results depending on this calculation. We present though the calculation in the
main cases.
3.1 No signiÞcant competition between employers
We successively consider the cases in which unfulÞlling jobs are the majority and the minority.
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3.1.1 A majority of unfulÞlling jobs.
Employment conÞgurations depend on the number of agents for each type.
The case n1 ≥ 3. Average pays in each employment conÞgurations are given by
wˆθ (1, 1, 1) wˆθ (1, 0, 1) wˆθ (0, 1, 1) wˆθ (0, 0, 1)
θ = 0 0 2 1 32
θ = 1 119
5
6
4
3
2
3
The point now is about establishing the probability of the various conÞgurations when n1 ≥ 3. Under
this condition, type 1 agents are indiﬀerent between the three jobs, type 0 agents, by contrast, are only
indiﬀerent between jobs 1 and 2. The hiring oﬀer of employer 3 violates their participation constraint.
 The set of draws compatible with (θ1, θ2, θ3) = (1, 1, 1) comprises: (1, 1, 1, ...) and (1, 1, 0, ...). The
Þrst of these draws lead to (1, 1, 1) with probability 1. The second only leads to it if neither the Þrst
drawn agent nor the second do choose the job 3. This occurs with probability 13 . As a consequence:
p (1, 1, 1) =
n1
n0 + n1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n1 − 2
n0 + n1 − 2 +
1
3
n1
n0 + n1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0
n0 + n1 − 2
p (1, 1, 1) =
n1
n0 + n1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
µ
n1 − 2 + 13n0
n0 + n1 − 2
¶
 The set of draws compatible with the conÞguration (1, 0, 1) are (1, 0, 0, ...), (0, 1, 0, ...), (0, 1, 1, ...),
(1, 1, 0, ...) and (1, 0, 1, ...). The Þrst draw leads to conÞguration (1, 0, 1) with probability 13 , the second
with probability 14 , the third with probability
1
2 , the last with probability
1
3 . Hence
p (1, 0, 1) =
1
3
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
1
4
n0
n0 + n1
n1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
+
1
2
n0
n0 + n1
n1
n0 + n1 − 1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
1
3
n1
n0 + n1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0
n0 + n1 − 2
+
1
2
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
p (1, 0, 1) =
7
12
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
4
3
n1
n0 + n1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0
n0 + n1 − 2
 The draws compatible with (0, 1, 1) are (1, 0, 0, ...), (0, 1, 0, ...), (1, 0, 1, ...), (0, 1, 1, ...), (1, 1, 0, ...).
The Þrst leads to conÞguration (0, 1, 1) with probability 13 , the second with probability
1
4 , the third with
probability 13 +
1
3
1
2 , the fourth with probability
1
2 , the last with probability
1
3
1
2 +
1
3
1
2 =
1
3 . Hence
p (0, 1, 1) =
1
3
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
1
4
n0
n0 + n1
n1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
+
1
2
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
1
2
n0
n0 + n1
n1
n0 + n1 − 1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
+
1
3
n1
n0 + n1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0
n0 + n1 − 2
p (0, 1, 1) =
7
12
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
4
3
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
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 The draws compatible with conÞguration (0, 0, 1) are (1, 0, 0, ...), (0, 1, 0, ...), (0, 0, 1, ...), (0, 0, 0, ...).
The Þrst leads to conÞguration (0, 0, 1) with probability 13 , the second with probability
1
2 , both the third
and fourth with probability 1. Hence
p (0, 0, 1) =
1
3
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
1
2
n0
n0 + n1
n1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
+
n0
n0 + n1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
n0
n0 + n1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 2
n0 + n1 − 2
p (0, 0, 1) =
11
6
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2 +
n0
n0 + n1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 2
n0 + n1 − 2
 One can easily check that P
(θ1,θ2,θ3)∈{0,1}3
p (θ1, θ2, θ3) = 1
The probability of occurrence of the various conÞgurations are given by p (1, 1, 1) = n1(n1−1)D
¡
1
3n0 + n1 − 2
¢
,
p (1, 0, 1) = p (0, 1, 1) = n1n0D
¡
7
12n0 +
4
3n1 − 2312
¢
and p (0, 0, 1) = n0(n0−1)D
¡
n0 +
11
6 n1 − 2
¢
where D =
(n0 + n1) (n0 + n1 − 1) (n0 + n1 − 2). For n0 = n1 = 3: p (1, 1, 1) = 40400 , p (1, 0, 1) = p (0, 1, 1) = 115400 ,
p (0, 0, 1) = 130400 and hence wˆ
0 = 1, 135 > wˆ1 ' 0, 961. Expected average earnings are calculated for some
values of n0 and n1 in the next table.
n0\n1 3 4 5
0 (0; 1, 222) (0; 1, 222) (0; 1, 222)
1 (1; 1, 129) (0, 983; 1, 229) (0, 666; 1, 160)
2 (1, 25; 1, 030) (1, 1; 1, 069) (0, 976; 1, 347)
3 (1, 35; 0, 961) (1, 242; 1, 007) (1, 142; 1, 040)
4 (1, 4; 0, 914) (1, 321; 0, 960) (1, 269; 1, 097)
5 (1, 428; 0, 879) (1, 369; 0, 924) (1, 305; 1, 093)
The case 1 ≤ n1 < 3. Average pay in each conÞguration are given by
wˆθ (1, 0, 1) wˆθ (0, 1, 1) wˆθ (0, 0, 1)
θ = 0 2 1 32
θ = 1 56 +
1
2ε
4
3 +
1
2ε
2
3 + ε
The probabilities of various conÞgurations when n1 < 3. ConÞguration (1, 1, 1) cannot occurs since,
at most, two type 1 applicants are available: its probability is zero.
 The draws compatible with conÞguration (1, 0, 1) are (1, 1, 0, ...), (1, 0, 1, ...), (0, 1, 1, ...). the Þrst
leads to conÞguration (1, 0, 1) with probability 12 , the second with probability
1
2 , the third with the
probability 12 . Hence
p (1, 0, 1) =
3
2
n0
n0 + n1
n1
n0 + n1 − 1
n1 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
the reasoning is the same as regards conÞguration (0, 1, 1) and one obtains p (0, 1, 1) = p (1, 0, 1).
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 The draws compatible with (0, 0, 1) are (0, 0, 0, ...), (1, 0, 0, ...), (0, 1, 0, ...), (0, 0, 1, ...). The Þrst
leads to (0, 0, 1) with probability 1, as well as all other draws. Hence
p (0, 0, 1) =
n0
n0 + n1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 2
n0 + n1 − 2 + 3
n1
n0 + n1
n0
n0 + n1 − 1
n0 − 1
n0 + n1 − 2
 The probabilities of these conÞgurations to occurs are given by p (1, 0, 1) = 32 n0n1(n1−1)D , p (0, 1, 1) =
3
2
n0n1(n1−1)
D and p (0, 0, 1) = (n0 + 3n1 − 2) n0(n0−1)D .
For n0 = n1 = 2: p (0, 0, 1) = 12 , p (1, 0, 1) = p (0, 1, 1) =
1
4 .
The reasoning remains the same for the other cases.
3.1.2 A majority of fulÞlling jobs.
Two cases must be distinguished.
For n1 ≥ 3. Under this assumption ε = 0 so that average pays take the following values
wˆθ (1, 1, 1) wˆθ (0, 1, 1)
θ = 0 0 1
θ = 1 119 − 495 43 − 235
For all θ1, θ2, θ3 ∈ {0, 1}, p (θ1, θ2, 0) = p (θ1, 0, θ3) = p (θ1, 0, 0) = 0. The probabilities of remaining
conÞgurations are
p (1, 1, 1) =
n1 (n1 − 1) (n1 − 2)
D
+
2
3
n0n1 (n1 − 1)
D
+
1
3
n0n1
(n0 + n1) (n0 + n1 − 1)
p (0, 1, 1) =
n0
n0 + n1
+
2
3
n0n1
(n0 + n1) (n0 + n1 − 1) +
1
3
n0n1 (n1 − 1)
D
For n0 = n1 = 3: p (1, 1, 1) = 14 , p (0, 1, 1) =
3
4 .
For n1 = 2. Under this assumption ε > 0 and p (0, 1, 1) = 1. The average pays for each group are
wˆθ (0, 1, 1)
θ = 0 1
θ = 1 43 +
4
3ε− 235
The fact that there is only two applicants of type 1 guarantees that an agent of type 0 be employed
and hence a reduced earning gap.
3.2 A shortage of agents of type 1
Where fulÞlling jobs are shared.
Possible conÞgurations are (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) and, if n0 ≥ 3, (0, 0, 0).
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 The draws compatible with the conÞguration (0, 0, 0) - if this conÞguration is possible - are (0, 0, 1, ...)
and (0, 0, 0, ...). The Þrst draw leads to (0, 0, 0) with probability 13 , the second with probability 1. One
obtains
p (0, 0, 0) =
 13 1n0+1 + n0−2n0+1 if n0 ≥ 30 otherwise
 The draws compatible with the conÞguration (0, 1, 0) are (1, 0, 0, ...), (0, 1, 0, ...) and (0, 0, 1, ...). The
Þrst draw leads to conÞguration (0, 1, 0) with probability 12 , the second with probability
1
2 , the third with
probability 13 . Hence
p (0, 1, 0) =
4
3
1
n0 + 1
The reasoning is similar as regards conÞguration (0, 0, 1) and one obtains p (0, 0, 1) = p (0, 1, 0).
4 Characterization of equilibria in the presence of competitive
pressures
We consider successively the case of a shortage of type 1 agents and that of a global shortage of applicants.
4.1 Shortage of agents of type 1
Workers of type 0 are led to substitute to type 1 lacking applicants. This can be accompanied or not by
the renouncement from the employers to stimulate an intrinsic motivation.
4.1.1 The case IB = 32 − 5, 5 > 0, 5→ 0.
In this case, the shortage of type 1 agents involves n1 = 1. Previous step indicate that Þrms 2 and 3 will
compete, that is the Þrms which would have favored type 1 agents if their reservation utility had been
IB. If she had to renounce hiring a type 1 agent, each employer j ∈ {2, 3} would Þll her job with a type
0 agent. This type being abundant, j could limit her wage oﬀer to the level binding a 0 participation
constraint. Minimal required pay would then be
w2 (IB ; 0) = min
½
2
3
(IB + 1) +
2
3
; 2
¾
= 2
µ
> w2 (IB; 1) = 2− 2
3
5
¶
w3 (IB ; 0) = min
½
2
3
(IB − 1) + 2
3
; 1
¾
= 1− 2
3
5
µ
> w3 (IB; 1) =
2
3
− 2
3
5
¶
Hence, each Þrm j will raise the bidding so long wj ≤ wj (IB ; 0). Let U1j denote the utility experienced
by an agent of type 1 by the highest pay oﬀer employer j might make. Previous discussion allows to state
that U1j is deÞned by wj
¡
U1j ; 1
¢
= wj (IB ; 0). The fact that it is beneÞcial to Þrm j to target the type
1 involves the arousing of the workplace identity. As a consequence, w2
¡
U12; 1
¢
= 23
¡
U12 + 1
¢
+ 13 and
w3
¡
U13; 1
¢
= 23
¡
U13 − 1
¢
+ 13 and hence
14 U12 =
3
2 < U13 = 2 − 5. Employer 3 is assured to prevail.
She contents herself with guaranteeing to the agent of type 1 a utility level U1 = U12 + ε, ε > 0, ε→ 0,
14One can check that for U12 = 32 and IB =
3
2
− ', it is true that 2
3
¡
U12 + 1
¢
+ 1
3
< 2 + U12 − IB .
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that is U1 = 32 + ε. The pay oﬀer made by employer 3 is then w3 (U1; 1) =
2
3
¡
1
2 + ε
¢
+ 13 =
2
3 +
2
3ε. The
fall back position of Þrm 2 is to hired a type 0 agent for a wage w2 (IB; 0) = 2. Workplace identity is not
aroused: job 2 is then unfulÞlling!
4.1.2 The case IB = 1− 5, 5 > 0, 5→ 0.
If type 1 applicants were abundant, the three employers would favor them over type 0 agents. With this
new value of IB, one obtains following values
wj (IB; 0) wj (IB; 1) U1j = Uj (wj (IB; 0) ; 1)
Emploi 1 1 1− 235 1
Emploi 2 2− 235 53 − 235 32 − 5
Emploi 3 23 − 235 13 − 235 32 − 5
When participation constraint is binding: job 1 is unfulÞlling to agents of type 0 but is now fulÞlling
to agents of type 1; job 2 is fulÞlling whatever the type of its holder, as well as job 3. The examination
of the utilities brought to an agent of type 1 by the best oﬀer of each Þrm shows: Þrstly, that Þrm
1 is pushed aside (for agents 1 hiring); secondly, that Þrms 2 and 3 do not succeed in diﬀerentiating
themselves. Their competition to attract agent of type 1 leads them to make wage oﬀers to this type of
applicant such that they are just indiﬀerent between hiring type 0 or type 1 workers.
For n0 = 3 and n1 = 1, p (0, 1, 0) = p (0, 0, 1) = p (0, 0, 0) = 13 . Average pays in each conÞguration are
given by
wˆθ (0, 1, 0) wˆθ (0, 0, 1) wˆθ (0, 0, 0)
θ = 0 56 − 135 32 − 135 119 − 495
θ = 1 2− 235 23 − 235 0
and hence the expected average earnings we obtain in the bodytext.
4.2 A global shortage of applicants
¡
IB =
3
2
¢
Competition can be polarized or not. The best wage oﬀer each Þrm can make to a type θ ∈ {0, 1} agent
is wj = Sj . Corresponding utility levels are
U1 (S1; θ) = max
½
3
2
S1 +
1
2
θ − 1;S1 + 1
2
¾
U2 (S2; θ) = max
½
3
2
S2 +
1
2
θ − 2;S2 − 1
2
¾
U3 (S3; θ) = max
½
3
2
S3 +
1
2
θ;S3 +
1
2
¾
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Let Uθ denote the utility obtained by the type θ agent in labor market equilibrium.
w1 (Uθ; θ) = min
½
2
3
Uθ +
1
3
(2− θ) ;Uθ − 1
2
¾
w2 (Uθ; θ) = min
½
2
3
(Uθ + 1) +
1
3
(2− θ) ;Uθ + 1
2
¾
w3 (Uθ; θ) = min
½
2
3
(Uθ − 1) + 1
3
(2− θ) ;Uθ − 1
2
¾
Polarized competition: cases 1, 2, 3 and 4. Following cases correspond to a balance of powers
such that competition is polarized on the exclusion of a single Þrm from the labor market.
Case 1 implies U3 (S3; θ) > U1 (S1; θ) > U2 (S2; θ) whatever θ ∈ {0, 1}. Job 2 does not exhibit
a large enough gross surplus to allow to the corresponding Þrm to make appealing hiring oﬀers. Yet,
this Þrm exerts a pressure on the two other Þrms as a potential entrant: its presence raise the utility
reservation of each type of agent. For U(0) = U2 (S2; 0)
¡
= 85
¢
and U(1) = U2 (S2; 1)
¡
= 3320
¢
, 0 Â1 1, since
w1
¡
U(0); 0
¢
= 1110 <
23
20 = w1
¡
U(1); 1
¢
, and 0 ≺3 1 since w3
¡
U(0); 0
¢
= 1615 >
23
30 = w3
¡
U(1); 1
¢
. Employers
1 and 3 do not directly compete with each other - their plans are mutually compatible. In labor market
equilibrium, types 0 and 1 utilities are hence U0 = U(0) + ε =
8
5 + ε and U1 = U(1) + ε =
33
20 + ε.
Equilibrium 3.1 For IB = 32 , n0 = n1 = 1 employers 1, 2 and 3 compete. Assuming (S1, S2, S3) =¡
28
20 ,
84
40 ,
4
3
¢
employer 2 is pushed outside the market. Employer 1 favors the type 0 agent, employer 3,
the agent of type 1. Labor market equilibrium is the characterized by
w = (w1, w3) =
µ
11
10
+ ε;
23
30
+ ε
¶
where ε > 0, ε→ 0
As in equilibrium 1, jobs 1 and 3 are respectively Þlled by agents of type 0 and 1. Let us compare the
impact of competition on the compensation of each job - and then of each agent type. The pay in job 1
is increased by almost 10%, that of job 3 almost 15%.
The case 2 involves U3 (S3; 1) > U1 (S1; 1) > U2 (S2; 1) but U1 (S1; 0) > U3 (S3; 0) > U2 (S2; 0). for
U(0) = U2 (S2; 0)
¡
= 7340
¢
and U(1) = U2 (S2; 1)
¡
= 15980
¢
then 0 Â1 1, as a matter of facts, w1
¡
U(0); 0
¢
=
53
40 <
119
80 = w1
¡
U(1); 1
¢
, and 0 ≺3 1 since w3
¡
U(0); 0
¢
= 7360 >
119
120 = w3
¡
U(1); 1
¢
. Employers 1 and 3 do
not compete with each others: for all θ, Uθ = U(θ) + ε.
Equilibrium 3.2 For IB = 32 , n0 = n1 = 1 employers 1, 2 and 3 compete. Assuming (S1, S2, S3) =¡
31
20 ,
93
40 ,
4
3
¢
employer 2 is pushed outside the market. Employer 1 favors the agent of type 0, employer 3,
the agent of type 1. Labor market is then characterized by
w = (w1, w3) =
µ
53
40
+ ε;
119
120
+ ε
¶
where ε > 0, ε→ 0
previous observations as regards the relative impact of competition on each job compensation is
conÞrmed here.
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The case 3 involves U3 (S3; 1) > U2 (S2; 1) > U1 (S1; 1) but U1 (S1; 0) > U3 (S3; 0) > U2 (S2; 0).
Let us recall that the Þrst concern of an employer is to make a positive proÞt. Employer 1 can at least
impose herself in the competition for type 0 employees, employer 3 in the competition for the agent of
type 1. Employer 2, once again, will be pushed outside the market. For U(0) = U2 (S2; 0)
¡
= 7940
¢
and
U(1) = U2 (S2; 1)
¡
= 17780
¢
, 0 Â1 1, as a matter of facts, w1
¡
U(0); 0
¢
= 5940 <
137
80 = w1
¡
U(1); 1
¢
, and 0 ≺3 1
since w3
¡
U(0); 0
¢
= 7960 >
137
120 = w3
¡
U(1); 1
¢
. Employers 1 and 3 do not directly compete: for all θ,
Uθ = U(θ) + ε.
Equilibrium 3.3 For IB = 32 , n0 = n1 = 1 employers 1, 2 and 3 compete. Assuming (S1, S2, S3) =¡
33
20 ,
99
40 ,
4
3
¢
employer 2 is pushed outside the market. Employer 1 favors the type 0 agent, employer 3,
the type 1 applicant. Labor market is then characterized by
w = (w1, w3) =
µ
59
40
+ ε;
137
120
+ ε
¶
where ε > 0, ε→ 0
Previous observations can be renewed here.
The case 4 involves U3 (S3; 1) > U2 (S2; 1) > U1 (S1; 1) but U1 (S1; 0) > U2 (S2; 0) > U3 (S3; 0).
Firm 2 remains outside the labor market. Its potential entry imposes Þrms 1 and 3 reservation utilities
U2 (S2; 0) =
41
20 and U2 (S2; 1) =
93
40 . Though, we have w1 (U2 (S2; 0) ; 0) =
31
20 < w1 (U2 (S2; 1) ; 1) =
73
40
i.e. Þrm 1 prefers agents of type 0; and w3 (U2 (S2; 0) ; 0) = 4130 > w3 (U2 (S2; 1) ; 1) =
73
60 i.e. Þrm 3
prefers agents of type 1. Firms 1 and 3 do not directly compete with each other.
Equilibrium 3.4 For IB = 32 , n0 = n1 = 1 employers 1, 2 and 3 compete. Assuming (S1, S2, S3) =¡
34
20 ,
102
40 ,
4
3
¢
employer 2 is pushed aside the market. Employer 1 favors type 0 agent, employer 3, applicant
of type 1. Labor market is characterized by
w = (w1, w3) =
µ
31
20
+ ε;
73
60
+ ε
¶
where ε > 0, ε→ 0
All the cases above represent a polarized competition: the point is just about neutralizing employer
2 but Þrms 1 and 3 do not exert any pressure toward each others. Cases 5 and 6 involve multipolar
competition.
Multipolar competition: cases 5 and 6. The case 5 involves U2 (S2; 1) > U3 (S3; 1) > U1 (S1; 1) but
U1 (S1; 0) > U2 (S2; 0) > U3 (S3; 0). This is then employer 3 who is pushed aside from labor market. For
U(0) = U3 (S3; 0) = 2 and U(1) = U3 (S3; 1) =
5
2 , 0 Â1 1 - since w1
¡
U(0); 0
¢
= 32 < 2 = w1
¡
U(1); 1
¢
, but
also 0 Â2 1 - since w2
¡
U(0); 0
¢
= 52 <
8
3 = w2
¡
U(1); 1
¢
. Employers 1 and 2 compete directly to obtain the
agent of type 0. Employer 2 is prepared to oﬀer up to 83 to obtain this agent which corresponds to utility
U2
¡
8
3 ; 0
¢
= 136 , while the maximal wage oﬀer of employer 1 is 2 which corresponds to utility
5
2 >
13
6 . Em-
ployer 1 prevails. It is enough to oﬀer wage w1 = min
©
2
3
¡
U2
¡
8
3 ; 0
¢
+ ε
¢
+ 13 (2− 0) , U2
¡
8
3 ; 0
¢
+ ε− 12
ª
=
23
5
3 + ε. Employer 2s fallback position is to hire a type 1 agent to which she oﬀers w2 =
8
3 + ε. Hence,
U1 = U(1) + ε but U0 = U2
¡
w2
¡
U(1); 1
¢
; 0
¢
+ ε > U(0) + ε.
The case 6 involves U2 (S2; 1) > U1 (S1; 1) > U3 (S3; 1) but U2 (S2; 0) > U1 (S1; 0) > U3 (S3; 0). This
change does not anything15 to the case 5.
Equilibria 3.5 and 3.6 For IB = 32 , n0 = n1 = 1 employers 1, 2 and 3 compete. Assuming
(S1, S2, S3) ∈
©¡
36
20 ,
108
40 ,
4
3
¢
,
¡
44
20 ,
132
40 ,
4
3
¢ª
employer 3 pushed aside from the labor market. Employer 1
favors agents of type 0, employer 2, the agent of type 1. Labor market is characterized by
w = (w1, w2) =
µ
5
3
+ ε;
8
3
+ ε
¶
where ε > 0, ε→ 0
5 An attempt for a general formulation of labor market equi-
librium
In this last section, we propose a deÞnition of the labor market equilibrium and show its existence. Such
equilibrium must specify for each job: 1) whether it is Þlled or not, 2) if it is, the type of the agent who
hold it, 3) the level of its compensation.
5.1 The building of a best response function
Let us assume four jobs are available:
¡
Sj , φj , ψj
¢
, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Three agents search for a job: one
with trait θ = 0, and two with trait θ = 1. Let us build the reaction function of Þrm j. Let j, j0, j00, j(3) ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4} be such that j 6= j0 6= j00 6= j(3) while Uj0 (wj0 ; 1) ≥ Uj00 (wj00 ; 1) ≥ Uj(3)
¡
wj(3) ; 1
¢
.16 This latter
15Firm 3 is again excluded from the labor market and hence U3 (S3; 0) = 2 and U3 (S3; 1) = 52 . We get w1 (U3 (S3; 0) ; 0) =
3
2
< w1 (U3 (S3; 1) ; 1) = 2 and w2 (U3 (S3; 0) ; 0) = 52 < w2 (U3 (S3; 1) ; 1) =
8
3
i.e. Þrms 1 and 2 compete to hire an agent of
type 0. Maximal pay oﬀers of Þrms 1 and 2 to an agent of type 0 are respectively: 2 and 8
3
. These oﬀers provide to agent 0
utilities U1 (2; 0) = 52 and U2
¡
8
3
; 0
¢
= 13
6
< 5
2
. Then, it is the Þrm 1 who prevails, limiting her oﬀer to w1
¡
U2
¡
8
3
; 0
¢
+ ε; 0
¢
.
16Nota:
Uj0
¡
wj0 ; 1
¢ ≥ Uj00 ¡wj00 ; 1¢ ; Uj ¡wj0 ; 0¢ ≥ Uj00 ¡wj00 ; 0¢
Take for instance the case b00 > b0, b00 > a001 = a
00
0 + γh and a
0
1 = a
0
0 + γh > b
0 > a00. then max
©
a01, b
0ª ≥ max©a001 , b00ª but
max
©
a000 , b
00ª ≥ max©a00, b0ª.
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condition is about the indexes j0 to j(3): they adjust so that it keeps holding.17
rj (w−j) =

min {wj (IB; 0) , wj (IB; 1)} = wj (IB ; 1)
if ≤ Sj and ∀k ∈
©
j0, j00, j(3)
ª
,
wk (IB; 1) > wk.
min {wj (IB; 0) , wj (IB; 1)} = wj (IB ; 1)
if ≤ Sj ,
wj0 (IB; 0) > wj0 ≥ wj0 (IB ; 1)
∀k ∈ ©j00, j(3)ª , wk (IB; 1) > wk.
min
 wj (IB ; 0)wj (Uj00 (wj00 ; 1) + ε; 1)

if ≤ Sj , ∀k ∈ {j0, j00} ,
wk (IB; 0) > wk ≥ wk (IB; 1)
but wj(3) (IB ; 1) > wj(3) .
min
 wj (IB ; 0)wj (Uj00 (wj00 ; 1) + ε; 1)
 if ≤ Sj and ∀k ∈
©
j0, j00, j(3)
ª
,
wk (IB; 0) > wk ≥ wk (IB; 1).
min
 wj
³
maxk∈{j0,j00,j(3)} Uk (wk; 0) + ε; 0
´
wj (Uj00 (wj00 ; 1) + ε; 1)

if ≤ Sj , ∀k ∈
©
j0, j00, j(3)
ª
,
wk ≥ wk (IB; 1), but
wk (IB; 0) ≷ wk.
Sj otherwise
where ε > 0, ε→ 0. Put in a more compact writing
rj (w−j) = min

Sj
max
n
wj (IB; 0) , wj
³
maxk∈{j0,j00,j(3)} Uk (wk; 0) + ε; 0
´o
max {wj (IB; 1) , wj (Uj00 (wj00 ; 1) + ε; 1)}

Let the equilibrium of the labor market w =(w1, w2, w3, w4) be such that 1 hires the agent with trait
0, 2 and 3 agents with trait 1 while job 4 remains unÞlled. This equilibrium is such that
w1 = max
 w1 (IB; 0)w1 ¡maxk∈{2,3,4} Uk (wk; 0) + ε; 0¢
 ≤ max
 w1 (IB ; 1)w1 ¡maxk∈{2,3,4} Uk (wk; 1) + ε; 1¢

w2 = max
 w2 (IB; 1)w2 ¡maxk∈{1,4} Uk (wk; 1) + ε; 1¢
 ≤ max
 w2 (IB; 0)w2 ¡maxk∈{1,4} Uk (wk; 0) + ε; 0¢

w3 = max
 w3 (IB; 1)w3 ¡maxk∈{1,4} Uk (wk; 1) + ε; 1¢
 ≤ max
 w3 (IB; 0)w3 ¡maxk∈{1,4} Uk (wk; 0) + ε; 0¢

w4 = S4 ≤ max
 w4 (IB; 0)w4 ¡maxk∈{1,2,3} Uk (wk; 0) + ε; 0¢
 , S4 ≤ max
 w4 (IB ; 1)w4 ¡maxk∈{1,2,3} Uk (wk; 1) + ε; 1¢

where for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3} , wk ≤ Sk. Note that U2 (w2; 1) = U3 (w3; 1).
17Note that, for any k, the condition wk (IB ; 0) > wk ≥ wk (IB ; 1) is equivalent to Uk (wk; 1) ≥ IB > Uk (wk; 0) so that
clauses expressed below are all consistent with Uj0
¡
wj0 ; 1
¢ ≥ Uj00 ¡wj00 ; 1¢ ≥ Uj(3) ³wj(3) ; 1´.
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5.2 Labor market equilibrium
For any vector w−j = (wk)k∈J−{j}, for all θ ∈ {0, 1}, let kθ (j;w−j) ∈ J − {j} index any Þrm such that
#
©
k ∈ J − {j}|Uk (wk; θ) > Ukθ(j;w−j)
¡
wkθ(j;w−j); θ
¢ª
< nθ
#
©
k ∈ J − {j}|Uk (wk; θ) ≥ Ukθ(j;w−j)
¡
wkθ(j;w−j); θ
¢ª ≥ nθ
Whatever w−j and θ ∈ {0, 1}, Þrms belonging to J −{j} can be ranked by decreasing U (w; θ). Firm
kθ (j;w−j)s hiring oﬀer simply represents the nθ-teenth best oﬀer (that of Þrm j being excluded) made
to agent with trait θ.
One can check that, in the equilibrium described above, k0 (1;w−1) ∈ argmaxk∈{2,3,4} Uk (wk; 0),
k0 (2;w−2) = k0 (3;w−3) = k0 (4;w−4) = 1 while k1 (2;w−2) = k1 (3;w−3) ∈ argmaxk∈{1,4} Uk (wk; 1)
and k1 (1;w−1) = k1 (4;w−4) ∈ {2, 3}.
Assuming it is proÞtable for j to hire an agent with trait θ, her oﬀer has just to be strictly preferred
to that of kθ (j;w−j) to attract an agent with trait θ. Given w−j Þrm js reaction function18 rj (.) is
given by
rj (w−j) = min

Sj
max
©
wj (IB; 0) , wj
¡
Uk0(j;w−j)
¡
wk0(j;w−j); 0
¢
+ ε; 0
¢ª
max
©
wj (IB; 1) , wj
¡
Uk1(j;w−j)
¡
wk1(j;w−j); 1
¢
+ ε; 1
¢ª

where ε > 0, ε→ 0.
Note that, since a job left closed entails a null proÞt, it is equivalent to assume that corresponding
employer spends Sj to obtain surplus Sj and hence rj (w−j) = Sj when minimal required transfer is
strictly higher than Sj .19
DeÞnition An equilibrium of the labor market is a vector w such that for all j ∈ J : wj ∈ rj (w−j).
We now show this equilibrium exists.
Proposition 7 If, for all θ ∈ {0, 1}, nθ ≥ 1, labor market equilibrium exists.
Proof 7 We follow the standard Nash equilibrium existence proof.20 For all j ∈ J, let us deÞne ρj :
×k∈J [0, Sk] → [0, Sj ] by ρj (w) = rj (w−j). DeÞne the correspondence ρ : ×j∈J [0, Sj ] ⇒ ×j∈J [0, Sj ]
to be the cartesian product of the ρj. A Þxed point of ρ is a w such that w ∈ ρ (w), so that, for each
Þrm, wj ∈ ρj (w). Thus a Þxed point of ρ is a labor market equilibrium. From Kakutanis theorem
the following are suﬃcient conditions for ρ to have a Þxed point: (i) ×j∈J [0, Sj ] is compact, convex,
nonempty subset of a (Þnite-dimensional) euclidean space; (ii) ρ (w) is nonempty for all w; (iii) ρ (w)
is convex for all w; (iv) ρ (.) has a closed graph.
Since ∀j ∈ J, Sj ≥ 0, ×j∈J [0, Sj ] is indeed compact, convex and nonempty; furthermore it is a
subset of RJ with J = #J < ∞ so that (i) is clearly satisÞed. For all θ ∈ {0, 1}, assuming nθ ≥ 1,
18Maybe this function should be understood as capturing an algorithm leading to labor market equilibrium rather than
as a reaction function.
19One can interpret this as reßecting the assumption that the employer choose to do the job himself.
20 See for instance Fudenberg & Tirole (1996, chapter 1, p.29).
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∀j ∈ J,∀w−j ∈ ×k∈J−{j} [0, Sk], kθ (j;w−j) exists. Hence, ∀θ ∈ {0, 1} , Ukθ(j;w−j)
¡
wkθ(j;w−j); θ
¢
is well
deÞned and ∀j ∈ J,∀w−j ∈ ×k∈J−{j} [0, Sk], rj (w−j), and hence ρj (w), is nonempty which entails
(ii). If ρ (w) were not convex, there would exist w0 ∈ ρ (w) and w00 ∈ ρ (w), and λ ∈ ]0, 1[ such that
λw0 + (1− λ)w00 /∈ ρ (w). For all Þrm j,
Sj −
¡
λw0j+(1− λ)w00j
¢
= λ
¡
Sj − w0j
¢
+(1− λ) ¡Sj − w00j ¢
so that if both w0j and w
00
j are best responses to w−j, then so is their weighted average. This veriÞes (iii).
Assume that (iv) is violated so there is a sequence (wn, wˆn) → (w, wˆ) such that wˆn ∈ ρ (wn) but
wˆ /∈ ρ (w). Then wˆj /∈ ρj (w) for some j. Thus there is an 5 > 0 and a w0j such that Sj−w0j > Sj−wˆj+35.
Since (wn, wˆn)→ (w, wˆ), for n suﬃciently large
Sj − w0j > Sj − w0j − 5 > Sj − wˆj + 25 > Sj − wˆnj + 5
i.e. w0j does strictly better against w
n
−j than wˆ
n
j does, which contradicts wˆ
n
j ∈ ρj (wn). This veriÞes (iv).
As compensating diﬀerentials claims, it must be possible to show that in the equilibrium, two agents
of a given type should beneÞt the same utility level. The case of no shortage of type 1 agents does not
raise particular obstacles: all the agents have for reservation utility IB, and all the Þrms succeed in Þlling
their job - at least those satisfying minimal proÞtability conditions.21 The diﬃculties we meet in other
cases echo the multipolar characteristics of competition. Each Þrms has to control: for potential entries,
for the pressure exerted by insiders willing to hire an agent of another type. Our attempts to treat these
problems are avaible upon request.
21That is such that S ≥ w (IB ; 1).
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